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Abstract
Average human behavior in cue combination tasks is well predicted by Bayesian inference models. As this capability is
acquired over developmental timescales, the question arises, how it is learned. Here we investigated whether reward
dependent learning, that is well established at the computational, behavioral, and neuronal levels, could contribute to this
development. It is shown that a model free reinforcement learning algorithm can indeed learn to do cue integration, i.e.
weight uncertain cues according to their respective reliabilities and even do so if reliabilities are changing. We also consider
the case of causal inference where multimodal signals can originate from one or multiple separate objects and should not
always be integrated. In this case, the learner is shown to develop a behavior that is closest to Bayesian model averaging.
We conclude that reward mediated learning could be a driving force for the development of cue integration and causal
inference.
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Introduction
Empirical studies have provided convincing evidence that
humans combine sensory signals into percepts so as to reduce
the uncertainty about their causes. Such studies, as reviewed in [1–
6], have commonly used the cue integration paradigm, in which
human observers are asked to infer a certain quantity based on the
observations of a bi– or multisensory signal. These experiments
may use stimuli across modalities such as in the judgment of the
position of an object based on visual and auditory cues [7,8] or
object size given visual and haptic cues [9]. Similarly, experiments
have considered cues within the same modality as in inferring
surface slant from stereo and texture cues [10] or depth from
texture and motion cues [11]. The overwhelming majority of these
studies has shown that humans combine these cues by weighting
them according to their relative reliabilities.
This empirical behavior has been modeled as inference of the
most likely cause of the observation given the sensory cues
and prior knowledge using the Bayesian framework. Bayesian
inference represents the uncertainty about parameters in the
inferential task explicitly as probability distributions. The variance
of the distribution resulting from optimally combining the different
sources of information is smaller than that of the individual sensory
distributions which reflects the reduction in uncertainty.
The Bayesian inference framework has recently been extended to
cases in which the observed sensory signals are caused by one of two
different scene configurations [12,13]. As an example, consider the
case in which a visual and an auditory cue are sensed. Whether
these cues should be integrated or not may depend on the
assumptions about the causes for these signals. If two separate
objects caused them, they should not be combined, whereas if the
two signals are likely to be caused by a single object in the scene,
they should be integrated. By representing theuncertaintyabout the
two possible scene configurations, the Bayesian framework can be
used to compute a posterior probability distribution over the two
scene layouts, a process that has been termed causal inference
[13,14]. Instead of inferring the scene layout, the task may be to
compute a posterior probability of the positions of the signal source
by weighting the likelihoods of the two scene layouts. While model
selection is the optimal strategy for the former task, the latter task
favors Bayesian model averaging. In most experimental setups
however, it is difficult to distinguish which of these strategies best
matches human behaviour or whether humans use a fixed single
strategy at all [15].
Despite the aforementioned successes in applying the Bayesian
framework to sensory perception, a wide variety of questions
remain open at the computational, algorithmic, and implementa-
tion levels, see e.g. [6,16]. The most central issue is how cue
integration and causal inference are learned on developmental
timescales [17–20]. A recent empirical study by Gori and
colleagues [17] showed that children under 10 years of age did
not integrate cues by taking their uncertainties into account.
Instead, these children were shown to almost exclusively use haptic
cues in a size discrimination task and visual cues in an orientation
discrimination task independently of their reliability. This suggests
that the abilities for cue integration and causal inference are
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 July 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 7 | e21575acquired through development. This result is particularly
challenging for some current theoretical models at the implemen-
tational level suggesting that cue integration is mediated simply by
the Poisson-like trial to trial variability in neuronal populations
[21,22]. These so called probabilistic population codes were shown
to be able to integrate probability distributions, represented by
probabilistic activity within specific neuronal populations, using
simple biologically plausible computations. However, it is unclear
how such a mechanism could be learned over developmental
timescales. It is an open question then, why infants and children do
not integrate cues optimally and how learning could proceed [16].
Further evidence for the role of learning in the development of
sensory integration and causal inference comes from a study by
Putzar et al. [23] in which the authors show that early deprivation
of one modality during the first month of life impaired
multisensory integration including this sense even after complete
recovery (see also [24]). This matches neurophysiological findings
in cats and monkeys suggesting a critical period of high plasticity
and large changes in receptive fields of multisensory neurons
during early development [25,26]. Neurons in superior colliculus
of newborn kittens and monkeys show little or no multisensory
responses, but the number of multisensory neurons grows and
their tuning gets sharper with age.
There is also initial evidence, that the mechanisms involved in
causal inference are not fully developed at birth, at least in cats
[27]. Cats were raised in an artificial environment, in which
auditory and visual signals were always shown at the same time but
at differing spatial positions. Subsequent behavioral as well as
neurophysiological tests revealed that the animals did not integrate
multisensory stimuli from a common location, as seen in animals
raised in natural environments, but instead integrated only signals
with the distinct spatial separation present in the artificial
environment. For similar results in owls see [28].
Based on these results, the present study asks, whether cue
integration and causal inference in sensory perception could
develop mediated by reward dependent learning. There are ample
data demonstrating reward dependent learning related to
orienting movements [29–31]. Furthermore, there has been
considerable work relating this type of learning to theoretical
models of reinforcement learning (RL), see e.g. [32]. Various
studies were able to localize areas in the human and monkey brain
potentially implementing RL mechanisms by looking for correla-
tions between RL model variables and single cell [32,33] or
BOLD activities [34–40]. Those studies show the relevance of RL
for learning in many different tasks and environments both on the
behavioral as well as the computational level. Thus it is interesting
to also consider it as one potential driving force, on the
computational level, for the development of cue integration and
causal inference.
Results
We use a multimodal localization task similar to the one used by
Neil and colleagues [20] and Ko ¨rding et al [13] (see Fig. 1 for a
schematic depiction). The learner obtains noisy visual and
auditory signals and carries out horizontal orienting movements,
obtaining a varying amount of reward dependending on the
accuracy of the movement (see Methods). We interpret the reward
as an intrinsic signal for bringing a relevant stimulus into the
center of attention.
The agent learns to solve this task based only on its sensory
inputs, orienting actions, and observed rewards. To this end, it
learns to predict how much reward to expect when performing
each action in a given situation. The learner represents its reward
estimates for particular state and action pairs as so called Q-values
[41]. Support for the representation of such variables in the
human and monkey brain comes from several studies [33,42]. In
our case this Q-function is approximated by a neural network (see
Methods). Based on these reward expectations, the agent will
probabilistically pick an action using a softmax function, which
also has been shown to match human action selection for some
tasks [43,44]. The reward prediction of the winning action will be
adapted depending on the difference between predicted and
obtained reward by changing all synaptic weights via a gradient
descent learning algorithm (see Methods).
In the following we will test this model on cue integration and
causal inference tasks and compare it to human behavior and four
different Bayesian models.
Cue Integration
We start with a simple cue integration paradigm, where noisy
auditory and visual signals from a common source have to be
Figure 1. Scene layout of orienting tasks and generative models. Top: Sketch of the orienting task used in this study. The learner receives an
auditory (za) and a visual (zv) signal, which are probabilistically related to the true position x. The task is to orient towards this true position. Left: A
case where the visual and auditory signals have a common cause. Right: The signals originate from different locations. Bottom: The generative
models for the task. The noisy sensory signals (za and zv) are either generated by a single (C~1) or two independent causes (C~2) having different
spatial positions.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0021575.g001
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of the error produced by optimally integrating the two stimuli is
always smaller or equal to the error variance resulting from using
either cue alone. Figure 2 shows the distribution of errors the RL
based model produces after training. This result matches well with
the predictions of the optimal Bayesian model for this situation.
To compare the model with human behavior, we test the fully
trained model on a two-alternative forced choice (2-AFC) task.
This task allows us to test the behavior of the learner for changes in
relative reliabilities between the cues. The setup is similar to the
one used by Ernst and Banks [9], where human subjects were
asked to perform a 2-AFC visuo-haptic size discrimination task.
Ernst and Banks could show that in this task the point of subjective
equality (PSE) of adults is well predicted by Bayesian cue
integration and shifts when additional visual noise is introduced.
The first input to the agent is the size of a standard bar with
constant position, the second is the size of a probe which varies
and is to be estimated as ‘left’ or ‘right’ of the standard
(respectively ‘taller’ or ‘smaller’ in [9]). Both stimuli are bimodal,
but for the probe the cues are always consistent, whereas for the
standard they are set to be in conflict with each other. Figure 3A
shows the proportion of ‘right’ estimates for all possible positions of
the probe based on the decisions taken by the reinforcement
learner after training as psychometric curves. Each curve
represents training and testing with a different visual noise
variance. We can compare it with the data from of Ernst and
Banks [9] (Figure 3B) which is reproduced in our Figure 3B. It
shows the equivalent data for the average of four human subjects.
Both plots show a similar pattern in that the psychometric curves
get steeper and the PSE moves more towards the visual stimulus
position for decreasing visual noise levels. Figure S2 compares the
PSEs of the RL model (crosses) with that of the optimal Bayesian
observer (circles) for different visual reliabilities. It can be seen that
they match quite well, as was true for the human subjects in [9]
(Fig 3c in their paper). Note that there is variability in both the
PSEs of the learner and the Bayesian observer due to the limited
number of test stimuli.
Causal Inference
In the following tasks we will add a second layer of complexity
to the task by randomly presenting trials that were generated by
different scene layouts, i.e. under either the common or the
separate cue condition. We will compare our learned model with
four Bayesian observers. One observer always integrates the
information from the two stimuli (we will call that one AI). A
second always acts as if both stimuli originate from different
objects and discards information from the less reliable modality
(‘‘Never Integrating’’ – NI). A third, more advanced, observer
computes the probability of one vs. two objects in each trial and
uses the optimal action for the more probable model (‘‘Model
Selection’’ – MS). The fully optimal fourth observer though makes
use of all information available by selecting an action under the
weighted evidence for each generative model, with the weights
proportional to the respective probabilities (‘‘Model Averaging’’ –
MA). All Bayesian observers, contrary to the RL model, have
explicit knowledge of position priors, sensory noise distributions
Figure 2. Distribution of position estimation errors. The
distribution of errors over 100,000 orienting actions carried out by
the RL model after 10 runs with each 100,000 training steps (black),
compared with Bayesian optimal integration (red) and the best single
cue predictions (dashed) for a single audio-visual object. Errorbars show
standart deviation of 10 runs. (s2
a~5, s2
v~5).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0021575.g002
Figure 3. Psychometric curves for 2-AFC task in comparison to human psychophysics. A: Psychometric curves for the proportion of ‘right’-
actions in an audio-visual 2-AFC position estimation task. The input positions of the standard were mismatched, with the auditory signal positioned
at 12 and the visual signal at 18. Probe inputs were matched and tested 1,000 times at each position (0–30). The point at which the curves cross the
black vertical line is the PSE. The curves differ in the variance of the visual noise (see legend), auditory noise was kept constant with s2
a~5. B: Plot
using data from a psychophysical experiment by Ernst and Banks [9]. They used a visuo-haptic 2-AFC size discrimination task and count the
proportion of ‘taller’-actions. The standard inputs were mismatched (haptic at 50, visual at 60), probe inputs were matched and varied between 45
and 65. The visual reliability was varied by adding external noise to the display.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0021575.g003
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decision rules as well as the reward expectations of the observer
models can be found in the Methods section.
To show the learning process of the RL learner, we can look at
the development of the potential reward received with a greedy
policy (always selecting the action which predicts the highest
reward). In Figure 4 one can see that the average reward earned
by the learner increases until it reaches a level similar to what the
MA and MS models show (see also Table 1 1A). Comparing it
with the simpler instances of Bayesian observers, the learner is
clearly better than AI and NI, that is, it implicitly incorporates the
existence of two different conditions. But it is hard to tell apart the
Bayesian MA and MS observers. Both are similar to the agent’s
performance in this task.
A different way of assessing the behavior of the RL agent is to
directly consider the expected total discounted reward obtainable
for a particular state-action pair, the Q-values. Figure 5 shows
subsections of two learned Q-value function approximations for all
inputs, a given action nd two different reliability ratios. The
highest reward is expected if both input signals are close together,
resulting in a high probability for a single cause, and close to the
target of the given action, resulting in a high probability for the
action being correct (Fig. 5 center of both plots). Importantly, if the
target of the given action can not possibly be a result of a weighted
average of the input positions – because the cues favour both a
higher or both a lower position, this action predicts little reward
(Asterisks in Fig. 5). For this reason the plots show an asymmetric
reward landscape. The slant of the area of highest reward (dark
red) depends on the relative reliability of the two cues, as can be
seen when comparing A and B in Fig. 5. The left plot is a result of
inputs with a higher reliability in the visual modality, therefore the
area of highest reward lies more along the visual axis, whereas in
the right plot with equal reliabilities for both cues it lies along the
diagonal exactly between the auditory and visual axis. The width
of this area, as well as the maximum predicted reward, is
determined by the absolute values of the reliabilities (narrower and
darker red in the left plot due to higher visual reliability). A smaller
reward can be expected if the cues are far apart – resulting in a
high probability for two causes, but one of them is close to the
action target – resulting in a high probability for the action to be
correct for one of the objects (Middle of each of the four figure
boundaries in Fig. 5 – the ‘‘arms’’ of the cross). The height of these
expectations depends again on the reliability of the relevant cue.
In the experimental setup from [13] participants were asked to
report in each trial both the visual as well as the auditory location
of a stimulus. To mimic this condition, we change our task
accordingly and add a second output population to the neural
network (see Fig.S1). Each population now represents the actions
for one modality (representing the arrays of buttons for the
participants in [13]). The rewards and the prediction errors are
computed separately (according to (3)). Table 1 2A shows the
performance after learning as the sum of both rewards. The effects
are similar to the previous orienting task, in that we see a
performance thats is similar to the predictions of MA and MS.
Despite changing the task it is still difficult to distinguish these
two Bayesian observers (MA and MS) from each other by
comparing the collected reward. A better discriminator should be
the variance explained by each observer in relation to the total
variance of the orienting error of our model (generalized
coefficient of determination R2 [45]). The differences between
MA and MS over all inputs are nevertheless still small (Suppl.
Fig.S3). Fortunately, since we have the full observer models, we
can find the inputs for which the optimal actions differ between
MA and MS, and then test the RL model only on those. The R2
values for these inputs are shown in Fig. 6. We also include an
observer which does probability matching (PM) for model
selection, proposed to be the strategy used by many human
subjects in a recent experiment [15]. It can be seen that the
Bayesian observer with model averaging explains the error
variances best for both visual and auditory output (grey and black
bars). The values for the MS and NI observer are the same,
Figure 4. Performance of the RL model and Bayesian observers for a single output. Reward obtained by the learner when choosing the
action with highest predicted reward (black) compared to the different Bayesian observers. Signals can originate from one or two objects. Left:
Change of performance during learning. Each data point is the sliding average of 1000 trials. Right: Barplot of the mean reward over 100,000 trials
after learning. Standard error of the means is smaller than 0.5% for all bars. (s2
a~3, s2
v~2).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0021575.g004
Table 1. Model performance for different set-ups.
Setup
RL-
Model
Bayesian
MA
Bayesian
MS
Bayesian
MI
Bayesian
NI
1A 46.62% 47.9% 47.04% 37.87% 41.57%
1B 46.32% 47.9% 47.04% 37.87% 41.57%
1C 45.86% 47.06% 46.18% 37.28% 40.88%
2A 50.51% 51.81% 51.08% 41.63% 47.71%
2B 36.26% 37.37% 36.53% 33.87% 34.28%
2C 48.74% 50.52% 49.70% 40.32% 45.67%
Average fraction of maximum reward received in 100,000 steps after learning
(s2
a~3, s2
v~2) for different variation the task and the model. Results of the
different Bayesian observers for comparison.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0021575.t001
Cue Integration as Outcome of Reward Learning
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 4 July 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 7 | e21575because the selected inputs represent those in which MS decides to
act according to the generating model with independent objects.
Complex Uncertainty Structures
While the presented system is certain to accommodate different
prior distributions of the relevant scene variable relevant for
obtaining rewards (see Table 1 1C for an example with a Gaussian
prior for the visual stimulus) because of the maximum total
discounted reward guarantees of RL, it is interesting to see
whether the system can handle different likelihood landscapes. In
many real-life situations, the uncertainty of a cue depends on a
number of factors. The following three experiments introduce
behaviorally plausible variations in uncertainty structure and
investigate how the RL agent can adjust to these.
Spatial Variation in Uncertainty Structure. Visual
estimates of spatial location should be more accurate in the
fovea than in the periphery of the visual field, given the human
acuity falloff (e.g. [46], see also [47] for an example in slant angle
space). Figure 7 shows the reward predictions for a set-up that
mimics this observation in the task that requires a single action.
The variance of the visual noise was low for stimuli in the center
and increased with eccentricity, whereas auditory reliability stayed
constant (Figure 7 shows results with linear increase of the
variance, but similar results are reached with other functions, e.g.
logarithmic decay). Training on this adapted task resulted in
reward predictions dominated by the visual estimate for actions
towards the center (Fig. 7 right) and dominated by audition for the
outer periphery (Fig. 7 left). In between these two extremes,
Figure 5. Exemplary subsections of two learned Q-value functions. Expected reward for visual signals (x-axis) and auditory signals (y-axis) for
the action of orienting towards the center. Red colors represent high, blue low predicted rewards. Left: Visual cue is more reliable (s2
a~3, s2
v~2);
Right: Both cues have the same variance (s2
a~s2
v~3). For a detailed explanation see main text.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0021575.g005
Figure 6. R2 values of different observers for the RL model with selected inputs. The black and gray bars show the results for the auditory
and the visual output for 50,000 trials with inputs that differ in the predicted action between MA and MS. Mean over 10 training sessions with s2
a~3,
s2
v~2, errorbars show standard deviation.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0021575.g006
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also be seen in the distribution of input weights to the hidden layer
(Suppl. Fig.S4). The weights from the auditory part of the input
layer have similar shapes and width across all positions, whereas
the visual weights get narrower towards the central positions. This
shows that reward mediated learning results in behavior that varies
with context within a single task, which is in accordance with
predictions from a Bayesian model that explicitly takes into
account context when computing the data likelihood.
Temporal Variation in Uncertainty Structure. In addi-
tion to a change in noise variance across space as discussed above,
in a natural environment the variance also changes over time. As
an example one may consider the change in the optimal
weighting of visual compared to auditory cues when stepping
out of a dim room into the bright sunlight. Due to higher
contrasts and thus smaller uncertainty, visual localization will
gain confidence in the latter condition. To simulate such
dynamics, we change the reliability of the visual cue at certain
timepoints during training (Fig. 8). The network quickly adjusts to
a change in visual reliability. The performance after a change
point (vertical lines in Fig. 8) quickly becomes similar to the
optimal predictions by the Bayesian observers. This is mostly due
to the generalization abilities of the function approximation. A
learner using a table with entries for every state-action-reward
mapping [48] has to effectively relearn its policy with every
change in conditions.
Shift in Uncertainty Structure. We can also adapt our
settings to simulate the conditions used in the experiment by
Wallace and Stein [27] to introduce mismatches in the spatial
alignment of stimuli from a common object. We ask whether
reinforcement mediated learning could also produce results similar
to the aberrant spatial integration found in their study. Therefore
we bias the auditory signal by setting the mean of its noise
distribution to a value different from zero.
Figure 9A shows contour plots of the Q-value function for one
particular action after normal (filled) and biased training (empty).
The area which favors integration (red) shifts by as many positions
on the auditory axis as are introduced by the bias. The same is true
for the unisensory tuning curves (Figure 9B), which were generated
by plotting the response of the same output neuron to sequential
single stimulation of each unisensory input neuron. These results
are qualitatively similar to the ones reported by Wallace and Stein
for the relationship between auditory and visual receptive fields of
single neurons in cat superior colliculus.
Discussion
The fact that cue integration in sensory inference can be well
matched by Bayesian models has led to the suggestion that such
computations are implemented in the brain by explicit computa-
tions with uncertainties. Accordingly, current research is looking
for ways in which populations of neurons could implement
Bayesian computations involving probability distributions [16,22].
This view has led to the often implicit and sometimes explicit
assumption, see e.g. [5,49,50], that reward dependent model free
learning does not mediate this behavior. Often these investigations
are accompanied by the implicit assumption, that a single
algorithm has to be attributed to the brain, despite the fact that
recent work by Daw and colleagues [51,52] has shown that
learning in certain tasks can be best explained by assuming that
multiple learning systems implementing different algorithms are
working together in the brain (see also [53–56]). Currently it is
unclear how cue integration and causal inference are learned over
developmental timescales, as experiments with both children and
animals suggest that cue integration abilities develop over time
[17–20,23,27,57,58].
Bayesian models of cue integration have been extended to cases
in which there is uncertainty about the underlying scene
configuration that generated the sensory stimuli [12,13]. In this
case of causal inference the observer has to judge how likely one of
the possible scene configurations may have caused the observed
sensory signals. There are two main ways how this could be done.
Either the observer decides on the more likely scene layout and
then interprets the signals according to this layout (model
selection), or the positions of the objects in the scene are judged
according to the likely positions according to both models and
then are weighted by how much evidence there is for either layout
(model averaging). Current empirical evidence is inconclusive
whether human performance in such tasks is better explained by
model selection, model averaging, probability matching or all of
those [13,15,59,60]. Similarly, it is unclear, whether any additional
contextual or task effects might affect the strategy used.
Here we investigated whether a reward based model free
learner using function approximation is able to learn an orienting
task requiring integration of cues. Furthermore, as the cues could
Figure 7. Exemplary subsections of the learned Q-value function for the foveation setup. Axes are the same as Fig. 5, but for three
different actions with constant auditory reliability (s2
a~2) and space varying visual reliability. L-R: Actions towards a peripheral(s2
v~3:25),
intermediate (s2
v~2) and central position (s2
v~0:25).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0021575.g007
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necessary to learn not to combine the estimates always, but to take
into account that at larger separations of the two cues it is more
likely that they originate from two different sources. The learner
was given two audio-visual orienting tasks to solve. In the first task
the learner was rewarded for orienting towards either one of the
two stimuli, whereas in the second task the learner was rewarded
separately for judging both the position of the visual and the
auditory sources.
Under both task conditions the learner was able to carry out
actions that combined cues according to their relative reliabilities.
The reward obtained when following the reinforcement learner is
higher than that obtained by the Bayesian learners that always or
neverintegrate.Itwas alsoshown thatthebehavioroftheRLmodel
best matches that of a MA observer. This does not necessarily mean
that humans always use MA, but shows the general ability of RL to
approach optimal behavior. A recent paper by Wozny and
colleagues [15] found evidence for a majority of subjects acting
most similar to probability matching (at the causal inference level),
but also a significant number of people that were better fit by model
averaging. Further research is needed to clarify whether this is
generally true or depends on additional parameters.
We could also show that the RL approach is able to deal with
more complex uncertainty structures in the input. Here, the
uncertainties are implicitly represented in the function approxi-
mation scheme of the value functions. Arguably, representing only
uncertainties that are relevant for obtaining rewards is more
economical than representing all potential distributions over all
available scene variables. Indeed, here the distributions over
sensory cues given relevant scene variables were not provided
beforehand to the system, as is common in the Bayesian cue
integration and causal inference setting. The proposed model was
able to also perform similarly to the Bayesian predictions when the
data likelihood was variable in time or space, when using non-
uniform priors, and for changes in the causal structure. Humans
were shown to be able to rapidly adapt to changes in cue reliability
[61–63] and causal layout [64]. Although we do not want to claim
that this is necessarily mediated by reward for the very early
adaptation, we show the potential of RL-mechanisms to react to
those changes. It would also be interesting to test children for the
developmental aspects of such rapid re-weighting [65], but more
experiments will be needed to clarify those results.
One feature that is missing in our approach is temporal relations
between signals, which in a natural environment provide an
important cue for causal inference (e.g. [66]). It was shown that
this influence is also plastic in children [20] and in adults [67], so it
would be interesting to see how reward mediated learning deals
with the incorporation of temporal information. The TD–learning
framework is in principle able to deal with delayed rewards. This
question will be addressed by future work.
All learning was done with immediate reward feedback to
individual actions using learning rules that have been well
established in conjunction with reward related learning and
orienting movements [31,32]. We are aware that using gradient
descent learning to update the weights of the neural network could
be considered problematic for a neural implementation [68]. In
Figure 8. Performance of the RL Model for two outputs and temporally changing reliabilities. Reward obtained by the learner when
choosing the action with highest predicted reward (black) compared to the different Bayesian observers. At each dotted vertical line visual reliability
changes. Each data point is the sliding average of 1000 trials. s2
a~3:
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0021575.g008
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more closely to biology [69–71]. Future work will nevertheless try
to use alternative solutions for learning of the synaptic weights.
Unfortunately we were not able to identify meaningful
intermediate behavioral strategies while the model was still
learning. It would be interesting to compare the behavior of the
RL agent with recent empirical and theoretical work on the
learning of cue integration, which suggest potentially different
behavior such as calibration of a less reliable modality by a more
reliable one [17,28,72,73] or using the modalities alternatingly
[18] maybe according to the so called race model [19,20]. The
modality providing the basis for calibration could depend on the
relative reliabilities, could be innately determined or chosen
randomly. Consistent with the first option are results showing that
even unisensory performance in certain non–visual tasks can be
worse in early blind compared to sighted children [72].
To conclude, the RL algorithm with function approximation was
capable of learning near optimal performance in the Bayesian sense
for both cue integration and causal inference tasks (consistent with
previous results with tabular RL [48]). Importantly, despite not
performing explicit computations with uncertainties, the reinforce-
ment learner successfully changed actions depending on the
uncertainty in the stimulus. Considerable evidence about the neural
basis of such algorithms makes this approach appealing. Further-
more, it gives a direct way of accommodating learning of cue
integration and causal inference over developmental timescales.
Thus, even if RL algorithms may not be the only mechanisms
underlying the human development of cue integration and causal
inference they could definitely contribute to their development.
Methods
Task Setup
In our task each trial consists of the presentation of two stimuli
in the visual and auditory modalities. These stimuli either
originate from a single common source (Fig. 1 left) for the
auditory and visual cue or from two separate sources/objects
(Fig. 1 right). A position x along the spatial dimension is chosen
from a uniform distribution for each object in the scene (but
results if, e.g., visual prior is Gaussian around the central region
are not different – Table 1 1C). In the two objects case we call
their positions xa (for the object that emits only an auditory
signal) and xv (for the object that emits only a visual signal). Space
is discretized to xmax~30 positions for ease of computation. The
received sensory signals are noisy versions of the true source
locations. We use additive noise with normal distributions with
zero mean and variances s2
a and s2
v. Note that the RL model is
also able to deal with noise from different distributions since we
do not implement the learner based on a fixed distribution. See
Table 1 2B for a setup with auditory and visual noise drawn from
a logistic distribution with median 0. This noise is thought as
being of sensory and/or environmental origin, e.g. background
noise, neuronal firing stochasticities and tuning densities. Usually
the variance of the auditory estimate is set larger than the visual
one, in accordance with psychophysical observations for spatial
tasks [74]. We call this noisy signal position za and zv respectively.
If the noise makes a signal fall outside of the spatial range, the
stimulus is treated as not present, thus resulting in a unisensory
training trial. An important implication of this setting is that the
structure of observations is the same for both possible underlying
generative models.
We use two slightly different versions of this task. In the single
output task the learner has to orient towards a single location.
That means in the case of two objects the reward only depends on
the distance to the object closest to the estimated position. In the
two outputs task it is required to orient towards both the visual and
the auditory positions of their respective cause. In case of a
common cause this should result in both estimates being equal.
There are separate rewards for the visual and auditory action. The
inputs were the same for both experiments.
Figure 9. Responses of output neurons after training with auditory shift data. A: Overlay of contour plots of the Q-value functions for one
action after unbiased training (filled areas) and after training with a 3-position shift in the mean of the auditory noise (empty areas). The contours
include areas with predicted reward values higher than 10 (red) and 6 (yellow). B: Unisensory tuning curves of the same output neuron for biased
(red) and unbiased conditions. The maximum visual response (top) does not change, whereas it is shifted by 3 positions in the auditory domain
(bottom). (s2
a~s2
v~3).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0021575.g009
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An approximation of the function relating state-action pairs to
predicted reward is learned. A three-layered neural network (see
Fig. S1) is set up with an input unit for each position in every
modality (here 60 input neurons). It should be mentioned that the
yet unsolved problem of limited scalability of RL approaches for
very large numbers of inputs, does also apply to our model. The
input neurons i are all-to-all connected with weights vi,j to neurons
j in the hidden layer (here j=0…29). Stimulus locations za and zv
are represented by the population activity of these input neurons
(see e.g. [75,76] for biological examples of population codes) in
each modality separately (the first half of the neuron coding for the
auditory input, the second for the visual one).
Each input neuron has a Gaussian receptive field, centered on
position za
i or respectively zv
i{xmax for i§xmax. The variance of
these Gaussians is in the order of the noise of the input stimuli.
Overlapping receptive fields of the input neurons simply help the
network to discover a spatial relationship between the possible
input positions. We also tested the framework with simple binary
input units and found no difference in the final results besides an
increase in learning time (see Table 1 1B).
A sigmoidal transfer function on the sum of the weighted inputs
gi produces the activation yj of the hidden neurons. These are
again fully connected to the output neurons x’ with weights wj,x’.
For every action x’ there is one output unit, with its activation ox’ ,
given by the weighted sum of the hidden layer activity,
representing an approximation of the appropriate Q-value. All
weights are drawn from a uniform distribution, the v’s between
{0:1 and 0:1, the w’s between {1 and 1.
Based on the network’s outputs the learner chooses one of the
available actions. This is done with the softmax function:
P(^ x x~x’js)~
e
Qx’,s=t
P
  a a e
Q  a a,s=t : ð1Þ
This probabilistic action selection rule chooses an action x’ with a
probability proportional to the relative predicted reward Qx’,s for
that action, given state s. We start with a high temperature
parameter t~t0, so that the learner chooses his actions only
weakly influenced by the initial reward expectations. t then
decreases exponentially with learning time (with t(t)~t
nt{t
nt
0 ),
passing 1 after a given number of steps nt. At smaller values of t
the selection favors more and more the action with highest
expected reward, thus exploiting the environment.
After performing the selected action ^ x x, the learner receives the
true reward r(^ x x). We use a reward function that is maximal if ^ x x
equals the true object position x, decaying quadratically with
increasing distance within a surrounding area (with radius r) and
zero otherwise.
For single output:
r(^ x xjxa,xv)~max(0,(r{min(jxa{^ x xj,jxv{^ x xj)))
2 ð2Þ
For two outputs:
ra(^ x xajxa,xv)~max(0,(r{jxa{^ x xaj))
2,
rv(^ x xvjxa,xv)~max(0,(r{jxv{^ x xvj))
2 ð3Þ
If only one object is present, the two position are equal, i.e.
xa~xv. In the experiments shown above we used r~4. Changes
of of r other than setting it to zero (only rewarding correct actions)
only have an impact on the learning time. We also tested the
model with an asymmetric reward function, where a correct visual
action would only provide half the reward of a correct auditory
action (results see Table 1 2C).
Based on the true reward, the Q-values for the particular state-
action pair will be updated proportional to the difference between
prediction Q^ x x,s and r(^ x x). This difference can be seen as a temporal
difference (TD) error for a single timestep. TD learning in general
uses discounted future rewards for computing the prediction error:
The Q-value function will not only represent the expected reward
of a single state–action pair, but also include possible future
rewards that are expected from the new state. In the present work
the learner has to only perform a single action per trial and
receives only immediate reward.
To minimize the TD error we use gradient descent to change
the weights of the neural network by Dw=Dv [77] with:
Dwj,x’~
{e(r^ x x{o^ x x)({yj), if x’~^ x x
0, else
 
ð4Þ
Dvi,j~{e(r^ x x{o^ x x)({wj,^ x x)yj(1{yj)gi: ð5Þ
e is an exponentially decreasing learning rate: e(t)~10
log(e0){ t
ne,
with e0~0:05 and ne~100,000. The results did not change when
using an alternative function for the learning rate, e(t)~
e0
ceil(
t
ne
)
,
with ne~10,000.
Bayesian Observer Models
We compare the performance of our model with that of four
different Bayesian observers, inferring the position of the object
given the input and the generating model C (Fig. 1 bottom). With
Bayes’ theorem and the assumption that the noise of different
modalities is independent we can write the posterior probability as:
p(xjza,zv)~
p(za,zvjx)p(x)
p(za,zv)
~
p(zajx)p(zvjx)p(x)
p(za,zv)
: ð6Þ
where the last equality is only valid if the two cues are
conditionally independent given their cause. The likelihoods
p(zajx) and p(zvjx) include all information available from the
input. The reliability of a cue is inversely proportional to the
standard deviation of this distribution. In the experiments reported
in this paper the prior p(x) is always uniformly distributed. Other
priors were used in simulations not shown, and the RL algorithm
was able to adjust to these and still perform close to the Bayesian
predictions. Since we are interested in the performance of the
model in terms of reward, actions are not chosen only based on the
posterior probabilities, but on the utility function U(^ x xjza,zv),
which additionally takes into account the expected reward
r(^ x x½a,v jxa,xv) (we write ½a,v  to cover both the one and two output
case) for a given action (see below). The use of different utility
functions can accommodate different tasks in a very direct way
and makes the behavioral goal explicit.
The Bayesian observers used here differ in the way they handle
the two different possible generative models (one vs. two causes;
Fig. 1 bottom). Model Averaging (MA) uses a utility function that
is a weighted average of the inference results of each model. The
weights are determined by the probability for one versus two
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known distributions using Bayes formula similar to (6).
U(^ x x½a,v jza,zv)~
p(C~1jza,zv)
Ð
r(^ x x½a,v jxa,xv)p(xjza,zv)dx
zp(C~2jza,zv)
ÐÐ
r(^ x x½a,v jxa,xv)p(xajza)p(xvjzv)dxadxv
ð7Þ
.Model selection (MS) in contrast uses only the utility function of
the most probable model.
U(^ x x½a,v jza,zv)~
Ð
r(^ x x½a,v jxa,xv)p(xjza,zv)dx, if p(C~1jza,zv)w0:5
ÐÐ
r(^ x x½a,v ,xa,xv)p(xajza)p(xvjzv)dxadxv, else
(
ð8Þ
We use a uniform prior over the number of objects in the scene
(P(C~1)~P(C~2)~0:5). Results of additional simulations not
shown here lead to similar results for asymmetric distributions.
We also consider two observers that only do inference on one
model, ignoring the second one – one always integrates the
information (AI) and the other always treats the inputs as
independent (NI). The utility functions of all observer models
are computed by numerical integration. For a given input we
choose the action with maximum utility.
Another possible observer model would compute the same
probability distributions as in MS and MA, but then select
stochastically from them instead of choosing the maximum. Such a
behavior is often called Probability Matching (PM). In our case it
could be used in two ways. A recent paper proposed PM at the
level of causal inference [15], an action will be chosen according to
one of the generating models with the probability for that model to
be the underlying cause (P(C)). Because this is an intermediate
between MA and MS we only consider it when computing the R2,
where we distinguish between those. The second possibility would
be to use PM for the action selection step, which was found in
various studies to be a strategy employed by human observers in
certain tasks [78,79]. This is actually implicitly assumed in our
model by using the softmax function to pick the action, thereby we
do not include this option in our analysis.
Supporting Information
Figure S1 Sketch of the neural network used for
approximation of the Q-value function. Setup for the
two–step orienting task, the setup for the simple orienting task
differs only in that the network has only half as many output
neurons, since only a single action is required.
(EPS)
Figure S2 PSEs of the model for the 2-AFC task. Plot of
the PSEs for each of 5 repetitions of training and 2-AFC testing
with different values for the variance of the visual noise s2
v. For all
trials s2
a~5. In the test trials the visual signal of the standard was
always at 18, the auditory at 12. PSEs of the RL model (black
crosses) and Bayesian integration (red circles).
(EPS)
Figure S3 R2 values of different observers for the re-
sponses of the RL model for all inputs. Same Plot as Fig. 6
but using inputs from the full space. The black and gray bars show
the results for the auditory and the visual output for 50,000 trials.
Mean over 10 training sessions with s2
a~3, s2
v~2, errorbars show
standard deviation.
(EPS)
Figure S4 Input weights of the NN for the foveation
setup. Input weights vi,j to representative hidden neurons. The
left plot shows the weights only from visual input neurons
(i~½0 : xmax{1 ), the right only from the auditory input neurons
(i~½xmax : 2xmax{1 ).
(EPS)
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